Guttman, Buschner & Brooks

Reuben A. Guttman

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Professionalism Makes Sense

This thing called “professionalism”

Law schools teach professionalism as if it were a code of morality for an elite club called the bar. Newly minted members of the club sometimes (perhaps too often) hear the words “professionalism” or “professional” foisted upon them by more longstanding members. The words are used perhaps as a brush-back pitch to new lawyers, who live in fear that the license they worked so hard to acquire will be expropriated before it is put to productive use.

Professionalism, of course, is a conclusory term, a label, that perhaps has been used so many times and in so many ways it is now a shell of a word that, when used in a critique, often leaves the alleged perpetrator wondering what he or she did wrong.

As lawyers, we manage the resolution of conflict or the avoidance of conflict. Lawsuits are about resolving conflict, while the execution of contract, for example, is about avoiding it. Of course, advocacy is a significant component of what we do; being an advocate can, no doubt, draw a lawyer into the conflict.

Yet, professionalism means behavior that keeps the lawyer from becoming part of the conflict, exacerbating the conflict, or closing channels that might be used to resolve the conflict. Remaining apart from the conflict is, unfortunately, no simple task; consider the tension created by bar rules that require a lawyer to “represent a client zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law.” [1] Consider that clients too often want their lawyer to feel their pain or disdain the opposition and most particularly their counsel. There are those clients who hire their lawyers to be bulldogs ; for their part, these lawyers may play that role to win the client’s continued confidence even when the case is headed south. And for lawyers who don’t go into a case seeking to play the bulldog, their opposition may be so frustrating or obstreperous that the response is bulldog behavior.

The late George Barrett of the Nashville firm of Barrett Johnson Martin & Garrison, LLC was a leading civil rights lawyer of his day and championed causes that, at the time, were unpopular. Barrett once noted, “I was glad to manage protest routes and get Vietnam demonstrators out of jail, but I won’t march with you. I think a lawyer has to decide.”[2] In 2014, when Barrett passed away at the age of 86, Nashville Mayor Karl Dean said, “George Barrett was larger than life and always willing to take up an unpopular cause if he felt it was the right thing to do.”[3] Barrett understood what professionalism meant.

Professionalism means keeping in mind that 99 percent of all cases settle or are resolved before trial and there may be a day—perhaps at the end of a deposition—where you or opposing counsel might say, “Maybe we should talk about whether there is a way to put this dispute to rest.” How do you have that discussion without a relationship with the other side? How do you have that discussion if the entire pretrial process has been consumed with personalized disputes between opposing counsel?

Setting aside the matter of an ultimate resolution, opposing counsel need to work with one other to create efficiencies in the litigation process. Professionalism greases the way for dialogue about document production; stipulations as to admissibility; or shortcuts to resolve disputes, including bifurcation, bellwether trials, and capping or putting floors on damages.

Professionalism also means resisting the temptation to meet your opposition’s bulldog behavior with that of your own. It means lowering the temperature between counsel. Consider a deposition where your opposing counsel is being obstreperous, making speaking objections, and coaching the witness. If the conduct persists, the matter may have to be taken to the judge. But does burdening the record with arguments over the obstruction make the record any clearer for court review? Or will such argument just detract from the goal of the deposition, which is to get information? If you ignore obstreperous counsel, are they more likely cease their conduct? Perhaps so.

And professionalism means acting in a way that makes the judge’s job easier, including giving your opposition an opportunity to complete a full argument, as opposed to interrupting. Using court hearings to personalize attacks on opposing counsel do little to curry favor with the court and only polarize a relationship with the opposing counsel, whose help you will need to resolve the case.

In an era in which we give attention to psychological well-being in the workplace, professionalism is also about lowering stress, which comes from dialing down the temperature between opposing counsel. It means understanding that being a zealous advocate is not inconsistent with being an honest and respectful opponent, a mensch.

Eventually, there will be a client who questions your decency. You might be accused of not being mean enough. Professionalism is also about educating the client on the style you will use to make the case more efficient, avoiding needless battles. The education process starts at the first meeting and continues throughout the retention.

For those teaching professionalism, it is not something that can be taught in a book or tested by written exam. It is something more suited to experiential learning, which may include simulated negotiations over pretrial matters, mock depositions, or oral arguments. However it is taught, students must understand that while professionalism is thematically about ethics, it is also about practice and efficiency.

[1] See, e.g., DC Bar Rule 1,3 Diligence and Zeal.

[2] See Profiles in Justice: A distinguished lawyer and friend – The Global Legal Post.

[3] Id.

Source: National Institute For Trial Advocacy

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The Leading Question: Rethinking How We Teach Direct Examination

Trial instructors across the country implore students not to ask leading questions on direct examination. For their part, students struggle to formulate lines of inquiry devoid of leading questions. Amidst their quandary, students find themselves perplexed when they watch demonstrations or clips from real trials and see leading questions frequently used on direct examination. So what’s the deal?

Perhaps students are taught a practice without an appreciation for the source of the practice. Federal Rule of Evidence 611 outlines the “Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence.” It is a short and easily understood rule. It is also a rule that is probably not taught in law school evidence classes. Yet FRE 611 is a gold mine of information because, among other things, it specifically addresses the use of leading questions. FRE 611(c) states:

(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions:

(1) on cross-examination; and

(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.

The rules of evidence do not categorically proscribe leading questions on direct; they may be used “as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony.” Questions that are foundational or involve matters that are not in dispute are the types of questions that can be posed as leading questions. Doing so creates efficiencies; it moves the case along. Interposing leading questions under these circumstances also makes the dialogue we call “direct examination” more natural and less formulaic. Think about a recent conversation with a friend or relative: it is human nature to cut to the chase with a leading question. And with court systems burdened with litigation—especially as we emerge from the pandemic—cutting to the chase is an efficiency that moves dockets.

For a new lawyer or one learning litigation skills, FRE 611 is empowering. Consider this line of questioning:

Q: Officer Smith, you were riding in the police cruiser with Officer Jones when Officer Jones pulled over my client’s vehicle?

Opposing Counsel: Objection: leading.

Counsel: Your Honor, I am just trying to move this proceeding along; this is foundational, and this is not a matter in dispute.

Judge: Overruled.

None of this is to say that students should not be taught how to ask non-leading questions or how to develop the skill of using prompts that turn the witness on direct examination into the storyteller. Learning how to use words like “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” and “how,” or similar words that place the witness in the driver’s seat as the storyteller, is an important skill. Yet it is also important to learn where to use leading questions to move the testimony along. Moving it along empowers the decision-maker—judge or jury—to focus on the witness when important questions, such as those dealing with matters in dispute, are asked.

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Remembering the Man Who Taught Us How to Interview a Witness

Larry KingHe was not a judge, a lawyer, or an FBI agent but he questioned more witnesses to history – from all walks of life –  than any lawyer I can think of.

Larry King died last month; he was 87 when he succumbed to COVID-19.

If you want to learn how to question someone, Larry King was the master. His interviews – stored for posterity on the internet – are a fabulous resource.

Larry King was naturally curious; every answer to a question only egged on his curiosity, often prompting one word follow-ups like “why ” which he would ask with his head propped on his wrist waiting in anticipation for the answer.  

King was also a master at creating narratives, sometimes punctuating an interview with a question laced with a bit of his own personal knowledge. He understood how to collect facts and he appreciated the absence of fact.  When interviewing Hank Aaron, who also died last month, King drew from his prior interviews with the “Home Run King” noting that in those interviews that Aaron had refrained from discussing racial issues. With laser sharp simplicity, King asked simply “why now?”

Larry King grew up in the Bronx; born with street smarts; he understood people.

He did not have an advanced  degree in psychology; he did not learn his skills in school; indeed, studying was not his cup of tea –as he often admitted. Yet, King was capable of examining “experts” whose CV’s spanned pages and included multiple degrees.

There is the legendary story about his interview of Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb. How does one prepare for such an interview? Read Teller’s works? Retain an expert to help prepare questions? Not King!

Shortly before his interview, Teller learned that King had not read Teller’s recent book, a sign that he was unprepared for the interview. An irritated Teller threatened not to submit to the interview but King made a deal; if Teller did not like the first few moments of the interview, he could get up and leave. King’s first question: “why do high school students find physics so intimidating?” Teller went into a monologue and the interview was off to the races.

Maybe it was just that King understood that beneath the titles and degrees, people are just human; they have basic emotions and instincts. King also had instinct and he understood human emotion; he knew how to make the interrogated feel comfortable; he knew how to get them to talk.

Larry King left us with a treasure trove of interviews which shed light on history and expose the inner emotions and perspective of those who witnessed or made history. And for trial lawyers and investigators – those who are in the business of uncorking the truth by getting people to talk, King has left us with a library of techniques.

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Mass Tort Deals: Must-Read Interviews for a Must-Read Book

In 1965, Ralph Nader published Unsafe at Any Speed, an exposé on automobile safety, and since its publication, consumer faith in product safety has never been the same.

The early efforts of Nader and his legion of young lawyers and researchers—who came to be known as Nader’s Raiders—spurred the growth of products liability litigation. Nader gave consumers and their counsel a reason to go to court: they challenged the safety of products from cars to cribs, and the courtroom provided the level playing field where even the little guy could be heard and get justice.

Now, 50 years later, a law professor at the University of Georgia is exposing impropriety in a system—known as multidistrict litigation, or MDL—that is designed to handle these types of cases.

In her 2019 book Mass Tort Deals: Backroom Bargaining in Multidistrict Litigation, Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch blows the whistle on MDL. She writes about a virtually unregulated system driven by deals between a limited group of plaintiff and defense lawyers involving tens of thousands of plaintiffs. Burch’s work is not just based on empirical data; she writes about victims of car accidents, misbranded drugs, and defective medical devices whose cases—purportedly consolidated only for pretrial proceedings—are resolved by court-appointed lead counsel through global settlements that give defendants finality and plaintiffs little choice but to accept the offer. Burch also raises concerns about a system that promotes, indeed at times coerces, settlements over the transparent litigation that has historically driven regulation and made products safer.

If one were to think her concerns involve only a small fraction of federal court litigation, think again. Burch writes that “from 2002 to 2017, MDL jumped from 16 to 37% of the federal court’s pending case load,” with 95 percent of those cases in the products liability arena.

The system that Burch writes about had its origins in the early 1960s, when the federal courts were flooded with nearly 2,000 lawsuits stemming from a nationwide conspiracy to fix the prices of equipment used in the transmission of electricity. With guidance from Chief Justice Earl Warren, who created a Coordinating Committee of Multidistrict Litigation, a process was created to drive efficiencies in the litigation of these cases. The work of Warren and the committee’s chair, Alfred P. Murrah—then Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit—paved the way for the passage of the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, in 1968. That statute provides for the coordination for pretrial purposes of civil actions involving “one or more common questions of fact.” Cases filed anywhere in the federal court system can be transferred to a single district for pretrial purposes. The MDL statute is short and—in contrast to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which addresses class actions—provides no standards for the appointment of counsel, class representatives, or for the approval of settlements.

With Supreme Court rulings on class actions in the late 1990s making class certification more difficult for plaintiffs, mass tort actions—rolled up into the MDL system—became the go-to method for handling matters that in yesteryear might have been addressed through the more regulated class-action system. The big plaintiff firms could still litigate massive actions and the defense lawyers could still engineer settlements giving their clients global peace.

Yet, the MDL statute addresses only pretrial matters—not settlement; not global peace; not provisions for opting out; not the appointment of counsel, the compensation of counsel, or the confidentiality of and use of materials discovered in litigation. It is here that Burch does a masterful job of exposing the “Mass Tort Deals” that have evolved from an unregulated system.

To get a better sense of the problem, I posed questions to Professor Burch and Judge Nancy Gertner, who retired from the federal bench in 2011 and now teaches at Harvard Law. My interviews are below.

Judge Gertner, do we have a real problem with the MDL process and how do you view that problem from having been on the bench?

The problem is the classic one: rules and transparency. There were no clear rules with respect to who is assigned an MDL. There is no blind draw, no concrete set of procedures. After I complained about the asbestos MDL shortly after I got on the bench—late 1990s—I was never assigned a case again. My complaint was that the MDL judge, Judge [Charles] Weiner of Philadelphia, was simply dismissing the cases “subject to their being reopened by motion.” The dismissals were contrived, done for the purpose of showing that the cases were moving. I finally got an MDL when Judge Robert Keeton died and my court assigned me to one that had been assigned to him. In the last year I was on the bench, I drew a civil rights case that was headed for the MDL court. My case was the first filed, a second was in Chicago, a third in San Francisco. All of us were up to date, willing to take on the case. It was assigned to neither of us; it went to a judge in Memphis who was on the committee.

If the MDL process were “merely” procedural, it would be one thing. But the decisions made by the MDL judge profoundly affected the substantive outcomes of these cases. Under the circumstances, the failure to have a transparent judicial assignment process is critical to the fairness of the proceeding.

Professor Burch, your book raises ethical issues regarding the MDL process. Why has there not been more of an outcry?

All of the primary stakeholders—plaintiffs’ lawyers, corporate defendants, defense attorneys, and yes, judges—benefit from settlements. And it’s in aggregate settlements where ethical issues arise most prominently. To give corporate defendants the closure they demand, some “settlements” (deals between defendants and plaintiffs’ attorneys) require plaintiffs’ lawyers to recommend the settlement uniformly to all their clients and then some take the extraordinary step of requiring lawyers to withdraw from representing clients who refuse to settle. That doesn’t leave much room for genuine consent.

Those who are most impacted by ethical violations are the plaintiffs, many of whom are severely injured and have neither the time nor the resources to make a stink. In a world of repeat players, they are the one-shotters, the ones who need and deserve the most protection because their voices are so rarely heard. But therein lay the crux of the principal–agent problem: if it’s in the lawyer’s best interest to flout the rules and get the deal done, there will be no outcry, only silence.

Judge Gertner, from your vantage point, why has there not been more of an outcry about the problem?

The question is who is likely to complain and to whom? Judges are not complaining; the assignments are a plum for the Court, entitling the judge to attend a yearly conference in Palm Beach. And the skewed assignment process is usually not apparent. (It was in my case.) The lawyers are not complaining. Candidly, many of the lawyers in MDL case are competing for lead counsel; the last thing they want to do is rock the boat.

Professor Burch, many of the MDLs involve drugs or medical devices. Are the issues you raise in your book ultimately impacting healthcare standards?

The mass-torts plaintiffs’ bar is a last resort, a failsafe of sorts, for when medical drugs or devices come on the market that do more harm than good. So, yes, there is a feedback loop from the courts to healthcare and vice versa.

The FDA regulates everything from tainted spinach to cosmetics to pet food. It can’t and won’t catch everything. There will be drugs and devices on the market that shouldn’t be. We would hope that litigation opens a window into the processes that allowed that to happen so that drug and device companies would avoid those kinds of mistakes in the future. But, if the past is any indicator, the profit motive is a very strong one to overcome.

Judge Gertner, what is the process for fixing the problems?

The authorizing legislation and rules should be redone. There ought to be rules with respect to the assignment of judges—a random draw, a set of principles. And the rules along with judicial training need to make clear that some cases should not be settled; the premium in the MDL is not—as it was supposed to be—providing a mechanism for shared discovery, with a trial to follow in the jurisdictions from which the cases came. The premium is on resolving the case.

Professor Burch, who needs to read your book, and what needs to be done to begin to fix the problems you identify?

I hope the book will appeal broadly to policymakers, judges, lawyers, and plaintiffs alike. It’s empirically based, but not stodgy. I aimed to make it accessible to a diverse group—from insiders who operate in this world daily to those who are injured and experiencing the judicial system firsthand.

As for a fix, there is no single, silver bullet. But there are many things that can improve it and judges can implement the changes and reforms I suggest without waiting for rule changes or legislation. I devote an entire chapter to proposals, but I’ve boiled the key principles down to the following:

  • Appoint lead plaintiffs’ lawyers based on the same principles of adequate representation that we see in class actions. In doing so, judges should invite applications and think about building the best team by seeking cognitive diversity—people with a diverse set of tools and skills, who approach problems differently.
  • Value dissent among lawyers and create outlets for it. As plaintiffs’ aims and preferences differ, dissenters can challenge the status quo and inject undisclosed information into the discussion. Dissenters can thereby act as a failsafe (but not a substitute) for adequate representation on key motions.
  • Tie plaintiffs’ attorneys’ common-benefit fees (the fees they are paid for their work on behalf of the group as a whole rather than their individual clients) to plaintiffs’ actual outcome rather than to the “sticker price” of the settlement fund. Begin by subtracting litigation costs and administrative fees from the gross settlement amount so that lawyers don’t profit from added expense. Then tailor awards to groups of lawyers based on quantum meruit. If there’s a group of non-lead lawyers who do little but advertise and freeride on leaders’ efforts, then taxing them with a higher percentage common-benefit fee might be appropriate. Conversely, if lawyers develop and try state court cases on their own, judges should reduce common-benefit fees for those lawyers to incentivize them to develop cases on the merits.
  • Empower plaintiffs to weigh in on their settlement awards. Awarding fees on a quantum meruit basis gives judges the authority to hear about the benefits of any deal from those who are most affected. Many plaintiffs want an opportunity to be heard, even if it’s just a chance to submit a letter to the judge. Some feel victimized not only by the corporate defendant but by the litigation process itself. If plaintiffs are receiving less than 50% of a settlement award, that should be a huge red flag for the judge.
  • Remand cases episodically. When leaders decide which cases they’re going to develop and which ones they aren’t, the ones that won’t benefit from multidistrict litigation centralization shouldn’t be waylaid by the MDL process. Likewise, if discovery reveals that a block of cases is no longer benefitting from centralization or if there is a global settlement that clients don’t want to accept, judges shouldn’t be hesitant to remand those cases to the federal courts from which they came. This gives plaintiffs the ability to credibly threaten trial and the corporate defendant the opportunity to demand case-specific proof.

And now my take. Our rule of law is a work in progress. That’s what makes is special. It is a system that welcomes critique and improvement. For NITA lawyers and jurists who champion the rule of law, the Burch book is a must-read. It is a catalyst for an open dialogue and undoubtedly procedural changes in the way many of these mass tort cases are adjudicated.

Reuben Guttman is a founding partner of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC, in Washington, D.C. Read more of his On the Rule of Law columns here.

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Effective Compliance Means Imposing Individual Liability

Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates said it in a memo dated September 9, 2015, and her successor, Rod Rosenstein, said it in remarks dated October 6, 2017: corporations act through individuals, and compliance enforcement must necessarily account for holding individuals liable for the wrongs they orchestrate under cover of the corporate umbrella.(1)

The logic is reasonable and necessary. We blame corporations for catastrophic environmental events(2), misbranded drugs that cause injury, and financial products that destroy the life savings of those who have toiled for a living; yet at the helm of the corporations—guiding their path of impropriety—are people, many of whom who have benefited handsomely from the corporate misconduct that they have captained. Unfortunately, in comparison to the guilty pleas that are taken by corporations, which cannot be put behind bars, prosecutors—both criminal and civil—barely scratch the surface when it comes to pursuing the individual human culprits.

This is not to say that there have been no criminal prosecutions of individuals for corporate crime. Insider trading cases are quite common, and when the wrongdoing has catastrophic consequences, as in Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and the Madoff organization, prosecutors have put real people behind bars.(3)

There are, however, too many instances where individuals have put a corporation on a destructive tear, and still managed to elude personal liability. Considering that many of the large drug companies have either taken guilty pleas or paid fines to the government for conduct that has placed patients at risk by causing the consumption of powerful, unnecessary drugs, it is astounding that few, if any, pharmaceutical executives have been pursued criminally for conduct tantamount to battery.(4) Imagine, for example, if an intruder broke into your house, opened your medicine cabinet, and loaded the cabinet with bottles of pills that were either not medically necessary—or worse—could cause physical injury or illness? How far removed is this from marketing schemes that cause doctors to write prescriptions based on misinformation, that cause dangerous products to be placed in medicine cabinets and ultimately consumed? Or what about the drug companies that funnel kickbacks to doctors disguised as “speaker fees” or “consulting agreements” while monitoring prescription data to confirm that the doctors are writing the “scripts” as directed.

In 2012, Abbott Labs, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, plead guilty to illegally marketing the powerful drug, Depakote, which is a limited indication anti-epileptic. Among other things, Abbott marketed the drug to elderly patients in nursing homes for off-label purposes and for pediatric use, even though Depakote was not approved to treat anyone under the age of 18. After the entry of a guilty plea, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, Timothy Heaphy, noted in a Department of Justice press release that, “Abbott unlawfully targeted a vulnerable patient population, the elderly, through its off-labelpromotion.”(5) Think hard about this statement; a company that holds itself out as a manufacturer of life-saving drugs was knowingly placing patients at risk for the purpose of making a buck.

In 2013, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals agreed to pay $490.9 million in criminal and civil penalties for engaging in proscribed marketing practices regarding the prescription drug, Rapamune. Rapamune is an immuno- suppressive drug—that is, it prevents the body’s immune system from rejecting a transplanted organ. At the time of the guilty plea, Wyeth had merged into Pfizer, and was no longer a standalone entity. Wyeth plead guilty to a criminal information, charging it with a misbranding violation under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In characterizing the case, Antoinette V. Henry, Special Agent in Charge of the Metro-Washington field office of the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations noted, “Wyeth’s conduct put profits ahead of the health and safety of a vulnerable patient population dependent on life sustaining therapy.”(6) Also in 2013, pharma- giant GlaxoSmithKline plead guilty and paid $3 billion to the government in order to resolve fraud allegations and the failure to report safety data. As part of a global settlement, the company also settled a series of civil claims under the False Claims Act, stemming from marketing derelictions including kickbacks.

Time and time again, large pharmaceutical companies have engaged in conduct that placed patients at risk, and, at times, caused real harm, yet, virtually no individual has been prosecuted or put behind bars.(7) The idea that misrepresentations, kickbacks, and assorted fraudulent schemes can be employed to cause patients to put drugs in their bodies at personal peril without anyone going to prison is stunning. Our jails have no shortage of inmates sentenced to long terms for selling illegal drugs and/or engaging in various batteries. Yet, when white collar executives engage in schemes to drive revenue by causing the consumption of extra drugs, or the use of drugs for improper purposes, individual liability is rare.

Consider that this nation is immersed in battling what the press now calls the “opioid crisis”(8) or the “opioid epidemic.” (9) This crisis reared its head at least a decade ago when the U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Virginia prosecuted the drug manufacturer Purdue Pharma, and three corporate executives for illegally marketing the drug Oxycontin. On July 23, 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia (James P. Jones, Judge) issued an Opinion and Order approving a criminal plea agreement and summarizing its provisions. Among other misdeeds, during a six-year period, “certain Purdue supervisors and employees with the intent to defraud or mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than any other pain medications.” Among an array of specific derelictions, Purdue representatives “told certain health care providers that Oxycontin did not cause a ‘buzz’ or euphoria, caused less euphoria, had less addiction potential, had less abuse potential, was less likely to be diverted than immediate-release opioids, and could be used to ‘weed out’ addicts and drug seekers.”(10) The court’s opinion noted that “Purdue has agreed that these facts are true, and that the individual defendants, while they do not agree that they had knowledge of these things, have agreed that the Court may accept these facts in support of their guilty pleas.” The plea agreement—accepted by the Court—called for Purdue to pay approximately $600 million to resolve civil and criminal claims. It also provided that no individual defendant would be incarcerated. In the absence of record proof of their culpability, the Court was left with no choice but to accept the agreement as to no prison time for individuals. Noting what we now know about the opioid problem, the Court made this ominous point:

I would have preferred that the plea agreements had allocated some amount of the money for the education of those at risk from the improper use of prescription drugs, and the treatment of those who have succumbed to such use. Prescription drug abuse is rampant in all areas of our country, particularly among the young people, causing untold misery and harm. The White House drug policy office estimates that such abuse rose seventeen percent from 2001 to 2005. That office reports that currently there are more new abusers of prescription drugs than users of any illicit drugs. As recently reported, “Young people mistakenly believe that prescription drugs are safer than street drugs. . . but accidental prescription drug deaths are rising and students who abuse pills are more likely to drive fast, binge-drink and engage in other dangerous behaviors.” Carla K. Johnson, Arrest Puts Spotlight on Prescription Drug Abuse, The Roanoke Times, July 6, 2007, at 4A. It has been estimated that there are more than 6.4 million prescription drug abusers in the United States.(11)

Fast-forward eleven years, and the opioid crisis—which commenced with pharmaceutical companies manufacturing and marketing opioids well beyond their legitimate demand—and we have a nation now addicted to drugs, with additional supplies flowing from Mexico and China. The origin of this crisis is not just the drug companies; it starts with the individuals who ran the drug companies, placing revenue generation ahead of medical need—perhaps because bonus structures and stock options made it personally advantageous.(12)

Today, legislators on Capitol Hill grouse about the cost of our healthcare system and debate what level of benefits should be reduced. Yet, few, if any, lawmakers focus on what should be a front-end question: how much money is being wasted through fraud and abuse? Few, if any lawmakers are even contemplating a second question: how much money is spent to treat injuries and illnesses attributable to drugs that should never have been taken? And few, if any, have contemplated how to change behavior by holding individuals accountable. And of course, few, if any, legislators have contemplated making drug companies pay for wide dissemination of honest information about their products as one Federal Judge in the Western District of Virginia contemplated over a decade ago.

At the end of the day, if there is a perception that only a legal fiction will be caught holding the bag (albeit a fiction impossible to imprison), corporations—and those individuals that control their conduct—will view civil and even criminal sanctions as simply the price for a license to break the law. And to company insiders—that is to say, the shareholders, officers and Directors—paying this fee for the license to break the law may be worth it if the analysis was simply a matter of dollars and cents.

In 2012, when Pfizer paid $2.3 billion to settle unlawful marketing claims involving a number of its products, it was a small price to pay for the right to engage in a history of conduct that generated a revenue stream in excess of $100 billion.(13) Moreover, it was a small price to pay for the right to poison the market for honest medical information and thus establish a standard of care that would generate a revenue stream in the years to come. Put simply, when companies engage in pervasive misbranding of their products over a period of years, they disseminate misinformation that then becomes the standard of care. While that standard may not be evidence based, it is still hard to undo. Hence, paying a mere dollar fine will not reset or correct the market for honest medical information; and so manufactures get the continued benefit of a standard of care which may encourage use of a product even though it is potentially harmful or not otherwise medically necessary.

It is not just a problem endemic to the pharmaceutical industry. An array of corporations routinely game the system seemingly calculating the penalties for non-compliance. Publicly traded big box stores routinely pollute our navigable waterways with runoffs from parking lots that aggregate toxic hydrocarbons from leaky vehicles. Similarly, manufacturing plants have created a legacy—and continue to do so—of groundwater contamination that will for centuries prevent the safe enjoyment of our aquifers and tributaries. They do so because the cost of preventing the harm may well exceed the fine.

The externalities of corporate greed are not only imposed on consumers. Labor lawyer, Jon Karmel, in his recent book, Dying to Work,(14) raises awareness of unsafe working conditions that have resulted in death and/or injury to workers. Karmel traveled the country to interview victims and their families and his book highlights how corporations have simply not placed a premium on protecting their workers from harm. Unfortunately, our laws make it too easy for employers to game out the penalty for unsafe workplaces. Workers compensation systems designed to provide injured workers with quick relief also cap liability by preventing direct causes of action for significant actual and punitive damages. There is no shortage of reports of coal miners toiling in unsafe mines replete with regulatory derelictions, who have lost life and/or limb in pursuit of company profit.(15) Yet, compensation systems cap the employer’s economic exposure and—again—at the end of the day, few, if any, individuals are held personally accountable.(16) For the corporation, the fix or preventative measures are often considered more expensive than the penalty.

Over the past year, the nation has come to realize what many have known as true for some time; that discrimination based on class, race, gender, and national origin festers in our workplaces. There may be few, if any, visible cross burnings in this century, but the internet and cyberspace are overflowing with evidence that the most vulgar forms of racism and gender discrimination are thriving even in the 21st century. Perhaps, some had thought, that the civil rights legislation of the 1960s struck a blow to discrimination, causing its demise. Although we sing the praises of this legislation, it too caps liability and limits the rights of the aggrieved. Consider Title VII of the 1964 civil rights act(17)—that statute requires that claims of discrimination be brought within six months.(18) Punitive damages are capped, and the courts have impeded plaintiffs from seeking redress on a class basis for wrongful conduct.(19) Other than damage to brand and reputation, employers can easily calculate the fee for the license to discriminate. Before the #MeToo movement, which now seemingly causes consumers to factor in a company’s compliance with laws proscribing discrimination in evaluating the integrity of a brand, derelictions of employment laws had less severe consequences for corporate wrongdoers. For years, Wal-Mart battled claims of pervasive gender discrimination without any significant impact on its brand. (20)

Against this backdrop, the regulators and those enforcing compliance routinely tout million, multi-million, and even billion-dollar settlements as evidence of efforts that change corporate behavior. But do these settlements really change behavior? The answer is no. If our laws are structured to allow corporate defendants to game out the penalty, corporate insiders will gauge the cost of noncompliance as the cost of doing business. Penalties that appear to be massive may be minimal when compared to the profits the corporation secured through wrongful conduct. If corporations can game out the price of non-compliance and individual wrongdoers can hide behind the corporate cloak and continue to collect bonuses based on unlawful corporate conduct, business will continue as usual. And this is the lesson for both regulators and lawmakers.

Reuben A. Guttman is a partner at Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC and has represented whistleblowers in cases against the pharmaceutical industry which have returned more than $5 Billion to the Federal and State governments. He is an Adjunct Professor at Emory Law School and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution. He is also a member of the Board of the American Constitution Society. He extends thanks to his colleagues Traci Buchner, Justin Brooks, Liz Shofner, Caroline Poplin, MD, Dan Guttman, Paul Zwier, Richard Harpootlian, the Honorable Nancy Gertner, and Joy Bernstein, who have been a constant sounding board for these issues.

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  1. See “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,”U.S. Department of Justice (September 9, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download; Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, Keynote Address at the NYU Program on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement (October 6, 2017) https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporate-compliance-enforcement- keynote-address-october-6-2017/.
  2. “Deepwater Horizon,” U.S. Department of Justice: Environment and Natural Resources Division, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/deepwater-horizon.
  3. See Aaron Smith, “Madoff Arrives at N.C. Prison”, CNN:Money (stating Bernie Madoff, release date November 14, 2139, is inmate 61727-054 at the Butner Medium Security Prison) (July 14, 2009 2:19 PM) (http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/14/news/economy/madoff_prison_transfer/; Marcia Heroux Pounds, “Dennis Kozlowski, former Tyco CEO who went to prison, back in M&A business”, Sun-Sentinel (stating Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski spent six and one half years in prison and was released in 2015) (Jan. 11, 2017 6:26 PM) http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-dennis-kozlowski-life-after-prison-20170111-story.html;”Bernie Ebbers’ wife files for divorce,” NewsOK (Worldcom CEO, Bernard J Ebbers, release date July 4, 2028, is inmate number 56022-054 at the FMC Forth Worth Federal Prison) (April 23, 2008 4:48 AM) http://newsok.com/article/3233823; Rufus-Jenny Triplett, “Prisonworld View-Corporate CEO Gets Skimmed Sentence,” Dawah Interational, LLC (stating Former Enron CEO, Jeffrey K Skilling, release date February 21, 2019, is inmate number 29296-179 at the FPC Montgomery Federal Prison Camp) (May,15, 2015) http://prisonworldblogtalk.com/2015/05/15/prisonworld-view-corporate-ceo-gets-skimmed-sentence/.
  4. See, e.g., “Criminal Resolution”, U.S. Department of Justice: Glaxosmithkline Settlement Fact Sheet, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/legacy/2012/10/09/Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf ; “Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion for Fraudulent Marketing,” U.S. Department of Justice: Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in its History, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department- announces-largest-health-care-fraud-settlement-its-history; Megan Stride, “Wyeth Paying $491 M to End Criminal, Civil Rapamune Cases”, Law360, https://www.law360.com/articles/461203/wyeth-paying-491m-to- end-criminal-civil-rapamune-cases
  5. See “Abbott Laboratories Sentenced for Misbranding Drug”, U.S. Department of Justice (October 2, 2012) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-laboratories-sentenced-misbranding-drug.
  6. See “Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Agrees To Pay $490.0 Million For Marketing The Prescription Drug Rapamune For Unapproved Uses”, U.S. Department of Justice (July 30, 2012) https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/pr/wyeth-pharmaceuticals-agrees-pay-4909-million-marketing-prescription-drug-rapamune.
  7. See Erica Goode, “3 Schizophrenia Drugs May Raise Diabetes Risk, Study Says”, The New York Times (August 25, 2003) https://mobile.nytimes.com/2003/08/25/us/3-schizophrenia-drugs-may-raise- diabetes-risk-study-says.html.
  8. Opiod Crisis Fast Facts, CNN: Health, (March 2, 2018 9:25 AM) https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/18/health/opioid-crisis-fast-facts/index.html.
  9. M. Scott Brauer, “Inside a Killer Drug Epidemic: A Look at America’s Opioid Crisis, (Jan. 6, 2017) (according to the New York Times, “the opioid epidemic killed more than 33,000 people in 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/opioid-crisis-epidemic.html.
  10. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 963 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2013).
  11. Id.
  12. See Reuters, U.S. Senator Sanders Introducing Bill Targeting Opioid Manufacturers, VOA: USA, (April 17, 2018 10:24 AM) (stating the idea of imposing harsher criminal penalties on drug company executives has been championed by Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders who has proposed the Opioid Crisis Accountability Act of 2018) https://www.voanews.com/a/us-senator-sanders-bill-opioids-manufacturers/4351732.html
  13. See Gardiner Harris, “Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case”, The New York Times (September 2, 2009) https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html.
  14. Karmel, Jon, Dying to Work, Cornell University Press (2017)
  15. See, e.g., Dana Ford, “Don Blankenship, ex-Massey Energy CEO, sentenced to a year in prison,” CNN, (April 6, 2016 11:29 PM) (explaining it was the explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine which killed 29 people. Massey CEO Don Blankenship was ultimately convicted of a misdemeanor with regard to the skirting of safety regulations. He served one year in prison and is now a candidate for the United States Senate in West Virginia) https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/us/former-massey-energy-ceo-don- blankenship-sentenced/index.html; Nicole Gaudiano, “Don Blankenship, convicted ex-Massey CEO now Senate candidate, calls for more mine safety,” USAToday: OnPolitics, (April 4, 2018 6:43 PM) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/04/04/don-blankenship-convicted-massey-ceo- senate-candidate/487230002/.
  16. See “Dying to Work: Death and Injury in the American Workplace”, Cornell University Press (December 2017).
  17. 42 U.S.C § 2000e (1964).
  18. Dov Ohrenstein, “Limitation Periods–What’s the Limit,” Healys LLP, http://www.radcliffechambers.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Limitation_seminar_-_Dov_Ohrenstein.pdf (Explaining in comparison to claims for contracts and most torts, six months is a very limited statute of limitations. Undoubtedly many claims die on the vine because they were not brought in time)
  19. See infra note 18.
  20. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al., 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (explaining the case is one of several cases impacting the ability to certify class action discrimination cases).